Fiscal policy with credit constrained households by Werner Roeger & Jan in 't Veld
 
Economic Papers are written by the Staff of the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, or by experts working in association with them. The Papers are intended to increase awareness 
of the technical work being done by staff and to seek comments and suggestions for further analysis. 
The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not necessarily correspond to those of the European 
Commission. Comments and enquiries should be addressed to: 
 
European Commission 





























This paper exists in English only and can be downloaded from the website 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications  
 
A great deal of additional information is available on the Internet. It can be accessed through the 





















Werner Roeger  and Jan in 't Veld  
 
European Commission,  










This paper explores the effects of discretionary fiscal policy in a DSGE model that 
explicitly models housing investment and allows for credit constrained households 
along the lines of the financial accelerator literature. The presence of credit 
constrained households raises the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory 
tax reductions and increases in transfers, and makes fiscal policy a more powerful 
tool for short run stabilisation. Fiscal policy is more effective when credit constraints 
increase, when measures are temporary, and when monetary policy is 
accommodative. This is a timely issue in the current financial crisis which can be 
characterised by a substantial negative demand shock and tighter credit constraints. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
With the financial crisis spreading to the real economy, there has been a revival of interest in 
discretionary fiscal policy.  As aggregate demand has plummeted, the sole reliance on the 
operation of automatic stabilisers  has been called into question. In order to support efforts 
taken by central banks to stabilise the business cycle, there have been widespread calls for 
fiscal policy measures to prevent a sharp decline in output. The European Council approved 
in December 2008 a European Economic Recovery Plan, consisting of structural reforms and 
fiscal  measures amounting to around EUR200 bn. to support demand and avoid a sharp 
recession
1. In response to the crisis many European countries have announced measures 
raising public expenditure and/or reducing taxes. In addition, the incoming U.S. 
administration has announced plans for a large fiscal stimulus amounting to more than $800 
bn.. 
  
This revival of fiscal policy has renewed the debate about the effectiveness of short term 
fiscal stabilisation. A decade ago, there was widespread agreement that it was best to "let 
fiscal policy have its main countercyclical impact through the automatic stabilizers" and that 
"…discretionary fiscal policy to be saved explicitly for longer term issues, requiring less 
frequent changes" (Taylor, 2000,2009). It was argued that countercyclical discretionary fiscal 
policy was "neither desirable nor politically feasible" (Eichenbaum, 1997) and "deliberate 
‘countercyclical’ discretionary policy has not contributed to economic stability and may have 
actually been destabilizing in the past" (Feldstein, 2002). These pessimistic views on the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy might have been justified by specific factors. First, the last 
decades have been characterised by a dominance of supply shocks. Blinder and Rudd (2008) 
provide empirical evidence on the importance of supply factors for explaining the stagflation 
period from the beginning of the 1970s to the mid-1980s, with two recessions in 1973-74 and 
1982 heavily influenced by strong increases in oil prices. The sudden increase in oil prices 
associated with the first Iraq war in 1991 also contributed to the recession in the early 1990s. 
When the economy is hit by supply shocks there is little active discretionary fiscal policy can 
do. A second factor that justified the scepticism on fiscal policy was the rapid financial 
liberalisation. As more households acquired access to financial markets and were able to 
smooth their consumption, fiscal policy became less powerful.  
 
The present situation is different with a large negative demand shock and an increase in credit 
constraints. This has led many economists to reconsider a possible role for discretionary fiscal 
policy to complement the operation of automatic stabilisers. The concern that, with interest 
rates at an all time low, there remains little scope for conventional monetary policy measures, 
has reinforced this revival of interest in fiscal policy
2. It is generally agreed that for fiscal 
policy to be effective, measures have to be designed to be timely, targeted, and temporary. 
But it is generally feared that this crisis could be longer lasting than average past recessions. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) document the aftermath of severe financial crises and argue that 
these are protracted affairs, with output falling an average over 9 percent, over a duration of 
roughly two years. Given the expected duration of the crisis, the often-raised criticism against 
discretionary fiscal policy, i.e. that it arrives too late, seems less relevant at the current 
juncture.  
                                                 
1 The plan provides a common framework for the efforts made by Member States and by the European Union, 
with a view to ensuring consistency and maximising effectiveness.  
2 See e.g. Feldstein (2009), Auerbach (2009) and Spilimbergo et al. (2008). 
  1This paper examines the effectiveness of fiscal policy in a modern dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DGSE) model in which credit constraints play an important role. The main 
transmission channels of the financial crisis into the real economy are thought to be through 
higher risk premia and credit rationing for households and firms. The crisis started in the U.S. 
with a sharp fall in house prices which led to higher default levels of less credit-worthy 
borrowers (see for example Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)). The economic situation was 
aggravated by the financial sector responding to defaulting loans by restricting mortgage 
lending and the so-called subprime mortgage market virtually collapsed. At the current 
juncture, it is of the utmost importance that this tightening of credit conditions is taken into 
account. The DSGE model we use is an extended version of  the QUEST model 
3 where we 
explicitly model housing investment and disaggregate the household sector into borrowers 
and lenders, so allowing for credit constrained households along the lines suggested by the 
recent literature on the financial accelerator mechanism
4. Unlike in models with only 
Ricardian households, a fall in house prices with households facing a collateral constraint has 
severe effects on their current consumption and housing investment, especially in a situation 
where the loan to value ratio is high. First, by forcing down indebtedness, net borrowers will 
have to reduce both residential investment and consumption. Second, the impact on demand 
could be longer lasting, since a reduction in the stock of debt will reduce residential 
investment over an extended period of time. And third, there is a multiplier running from a 
tightening of the borrowing constraint via lower residential investment to a fall in house 
prices (housing wealth). This reduces the value of the collateral and feeds back into a further 
tightening of the borrowing constraint. These effects are obviously strengthened when banks 
respond by increasing their collateral requirements.  
 
By disaggregating households into credit constrained and a non-constrained group, we can 
investigate the importance of increasing credit constraints on the effectiveness of 
discretionary fiscal policy. The presence of credit constrained households raises the marginal 
propensity to consume out of transitory tax reductions and increases in transfers, and hence 
makes fiscal policy a more powerful tool for short run stabilisation. We use a two-region 
version of this model, consisting of the EU and the rest of the world, to look at the effects of a 
fiscal stimulus in the EU alone as well as a global fiscal stimulus, and also consider spillovers 
accross the two regions.   
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section starts with a brief overview of 
the empirical literature. This is followed by a description of the model with a special emphasis 
on the household sector. In this section we also show that an economy with credit constrained 
households responds more strongly to temporary fiscal policy measures. The following 
section presents the simulation results and discusses the effect the introduction of credit 
constrained households has on the effectiveness of temporary and permanent tax and 
expenditure measures. This is followed by a sensitivity analysis with respect to the monetary 
policy assumptions. The final section concludes. 
 
                                                 
3 For a description of the QUEST model, see Ratto et al. (2009a) 
4 See e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2008), Monacelli (2007), Calza, 
Monacelli and Stracca (2007). 
  22.  Overview of empirical literature 
 
The empirical literature on the effects of discretionary fiscal policy shows estimates of fiscal 
multipliers vary widely. Approaches based on micro studies of past tax rebates show roughly 
half to two-third of the income effect is spent on higher consumption (e.g. Broda and Parker, 
2008) but this contrasts sharply with macro evidence that shows no increase in consumption 
following the May 2008 US tax rebate (Taylor, 2009). Narrative studies of the effects of tax 
changes find very large effects, like a (permanent) 1 per cent of GDP tax increase leading to a 
3 per cent contraction in GDP (Romer and Romer, 2007). On the other hand, narrative studies 
of episodes of extraordinary spending have tended to find much weaker or negative effects on 
output (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998).  
 
Estimates from VAR studies also vary widely. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) applied structural 
vector autoregression (SVAR) methodology to study the effects of fiscal policy in the US. 
They find positive effects on output for increases in spending and negative effects for 
increases in taxes. In most cases the multipliers are small, often close to one. Gali et al. (2007) 
report VAR estimates for the US using data back to the 1950s and report a spending 
multiplier of 0.78 on impact and of 1.74 at the end of the second year. Using sign restrictions 
on the impulse response functions, Mountford and Uhlig (2005) estimate the effects of a 
“balanced budget” and a “deficit spending” shock. They find that government spending 
shocks crowd out both residential and non-residential investment, but they hardly change 
consumption (the response of the latter is small and insignificant). Various authors have 
extended the SVAR methodology to include other countries. Perotti (2005) looks at five 
OECD countries and finds generally weaker effects when including interest rates in the VAR. 
The effects of government spending shocks and tax cuts on GDP and its components have 
become substantially weaker over time: in the post-1980 period these effects are mostly 
negative, in particular on private investment. Only for the US is the consumption response 
found positive and did the GDP multiplier exceed one in the post-1980 period. De Castro and 
Fernandez de Cos (2006) find a positive relationship between government spending and 
output in the short term for Spain, but a negative one in the medium and long term, while 
Giordano et al. (2007) find a positive and persistent effects on output and consumption for 
Italy. Afonso and Sousa (2009) investigate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy using a 
Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression approach on quarterly date for four countries and 
stress the importance of explicitly modelling government debt dynamics in the model. They 
find government spending shocks have in general a small effect on GDP, often negative, and 
lead to important crowding-out effects, in particular on investment.  
 
Estimates from DSGE models also differ widely with respect to the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy. While there seems to be agreement that there is a crowding out effect of government 
spending on private investment, there is little consensus on the effect of government spending 
on private consumption both empirically and in the DSGE literature. A positive consumption 
multiplier is a prerequisite for a large expenditure multiplier. Ravn et al. (2007) introduce a 
market structure into the model which implies a strong decline in the mark up in the case of a 
government spending shock in order to generate a positive consumption effect. Monacelli et 
al. (2008) introduce a utility function which implies a stronger comovement between hours 
worked and consumption in order to generate the same effect. Gali et al. (2007) generate a 
positive effect on private consumption by introducing substantial capital market imperfections 
in the form of liquidity constrained households. Ratto et al. (2009a) estimate a first year 
multiplier for government consumption shocks of around 0.6 with an estimated share of 
  3liquidity constrained households of about 30% for the euro area, similar for government 
investment but lower for transfers. Private consumption by liquidity-constrained households 
rises in response to a government spending shock, but that of non-constrained households 
falls, and aggregate consumption declines. Coenen and Straub (2005) also find for a similar 
share of non-Ricardian households a short-lived rise in liquidity-constrained consumption, but 
falling below its steady state level after a few quarters, and a decline in aggregate 
consumption.  It appears that one needs extreme shares of liquidity constrained households - i. 
e. households who don't have access to capital markets at all - in order to generate at least a 
non negative response of private consumption. This seems to be at odds with observed 
estimates of the share of liquidity constrained households. Credit constraints constitute an 
attractive alternative hypothesis. Given the uncertainty about income and wealth 
developments of borrowers, banks typically impose collateral constraints. This paper 
therefore explores the consequences for fiscal policy of this credit market friction. 
 
3. The  Model 
 
We consider a two region world economy where we distinguish between the European Union 
and the rest of the world. There are three production sectors in each region, namely a sector 
producing tradables, non tradables and houses. We distinguish between Ricardian households 
which have full access to financial markets, credit constrained households facing a collateral 
constraint on their borrowing and liquidity constrained households which do not engage in 
financial markets. And there is a monetary and fiscal authority, both following rules based 
stabilisation policies. Behavioural and technological relationships can be subject to 













There is a tradable and a non tradable sector, and there is a housing sector.  
 
 
3.1.1 Producers of tradables and non tradables 
 
Firms operating in the tradable and non tradable sector are indexed by T and NT respectively  
j=(T,NT). Each firm produces a variety of the domestic good which is an imperfect substitute 
for varieties produced by other firms. Because of imperfect substitutability, firms are 
monopolistically competitive in the goods market and face a demand function for goods. 
Domestic firms in the tradable sector sell consumption goods and services to private domestic 
and foreign households and the domestic and foreign government and they sell investment 
and intermediate goods to other domestic and foreign firms. The non tradable sector sells 
consumption goods and services only to domestic households and the domestic government 
and they sell investment and intermediate goods only to domestic firms including the 
                                                 
5 Lower cases denote logarithms, i.e. zt = log(Zt ). Lower cases are also used for ratios and rates. In particular we 
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  4residential construction sector. Preferences for varieties of tradables and non tradables can 
differ resulting in different mark ups for the tradable and non tradable sector.  
Output is produced with a CES production function nesting a Cobb Douglas technology for 
value added using capital   and production workers  , augmented with public 
capital   , and a CES function for domestically produced (INTD), imported (INTF) and 
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The term  represents overhead labour. Total employment of the firm   is itself a CES 





1 > θ  determines the 
degree of substitutability among different types of labour. Firms also decide about the degree 
of capacity utilisation ( ). There is an economy wide technology shock  . The 
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where  i
K denotes the rental rate of capital. Firms also face technological and regulatory 
constraints which restrict their price setting, employment and capacity utilisation decisions. 
Price setting rigidities can be the result of the internal organisation of the firm or specific 
customer-firm relationships associated with certain market structures. Costs of adjusting 
labour have a strong job specific component (e.g. training costs) but higher employment 
adjustment costs may also arise in heavily regulated labour markets with search frictions. 
Costs associated with the utilisation of capital can result from higher maintenance costs 
associated with a more intensive use of a piece of capital equipment. The following convex 
functional forms are chosen 
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The firm determines labour input, capital services  and prices optimally in each period given 
the technological and administrative constraints as well as demand conditions. The first order 
conditions are given by: 
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Where ηt is the Lagrange multiplier of the technological constraint and rt is the real interest 
rate. Firms equate the marginal product of labour, net of marginal adjustment costs, to wage 
costs. As can be seen from the left hand side of equation (6a), the convex part of the 
adjustment cost function penalises in cost terms accelerations and decelerations of changes in 
employment. Equations (6b-c) jointly determine the optimal capital stock and capacity 
utilisation by equating the marginal value product of capital to the rental price and the 
marginal product of capital services to the marginal cost of increasing capacity. Equation (6d) 
defines the mark up factor as a function of the elasticity of substitution and changes in 
inflation. The average mark up is equal to the inverse of the price elasticity of demand. We 
follow the empirical literature and allow for additional backward looking elements by 
assuming that a fraction (1-sfp) of firms index price increases to inflation in t-1. Finally we 
also allow for a mark up shock. This leads to the following specification: 
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3.1.2   Residential construction 
 
Firms  h in the residential construction sector use new land ( ) sold by (Ricardian) 







































Firms in the residential construction sector are monopolistically competitive and face price 
adjustment costs, thus the mark up is given by 
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New and existing houses are perfect substitutes. Thus households can make capital gains or 






The household sector consists of a continuum of households  . There are   
households which are liquidity constrained and indexed by l.  These households do not trade 
on asset markets and consume their disposable income each period. A fraction    of all 
households are Ricardian and indexed by r and   households are credit constrained and 
indexed by c. The period utility function is identical for each household type and separable in 
consumption ( ) , leisure ( ) and housing services ( ). We also allow for habit 
persistence in consumption and leisure. Thus temporal utility for consumption is given by  
































All three types of households supply differentiated labour services to unions which maximise 
a joint utility function for each type of labour i.  It is assumed that types of labour are 
distributed equally over the three household types. Nominal rigidity in wage setting is 
introduced by assuming that the household faces adjustment costs for changing wages. These 
adjustment costs are borne by the household.  
 
 
3.2.1 Ricardian households 
 
Ricardian households have full access to financial markets. They hold domestic government 
bonds( ) and bonds issued by other domestic and foreign households ( ), real 
capitals ( ) of the tradable and non tradable sector as well as the stock of land ( ) 
which is still available for building new houses and cash balances ( ). The household 
receives income from labour, financial assets, rental income from lending capital to firms, 
selling land to the residential construction sector plus profit income from firms owned by the 
household (tradables, non tradables, residential construction). We assume that all domestic 














  7income at rate  . In addition households pay lump-sum taxes T
LS. We assume that income 
from financial wealth is subject to different types of risk. Domestic bonds yield risk-free 
nominal return equal to it. Domestic and foreign bonds are subject to (stochastic) risk premia 
linked to net foreign indebtedness. An equity premium on real assets arises because of 
uncertainty about the future value of real assets. The Lagrangian of this maximisation 
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The investment decisions w. r. t. physical capital and housing are subject to convex 
adjustment costs, therefore we make a distinction between real investment expenditure 
( ) and physical investment ( ). Investment expenditure of households including 


























































































   
 
The budget constraint is written in real terms with all prices expressed relative to the GDP 
deflator (P). Investment is a composite of domestic and foreign goods. From the first order 
conditions we can derive the following consumption rule, where the ratio of the marginal 
utility of consumption in period t and t+1 is equated to the real interest rate adjusted for the 
rate of time preference 
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From the arbitrage condition of investment we can derive an investment rule which links 
capital formation to the shadow price of capital. 
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Where the shadow price of capital is given as the present discounted value of the rental 
income from physical capital 
 















































From the FOC for housing investment we can derive a housing investment rule, which links 
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The shadow price of housing capital can be represented as the present discounted value of the 
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For the price of land we one obtain a (quasi) Hotelling rule 
 





















The growth rate of the price of land must guarantee a rate of return which can be earned by 
other assets, i. e. the growth rate of land must be equal to  .  L t g r −
 
 
3.2.2 Credit constrained households 
 
Credit constrained households differ from Ricardian households in two respects. First they 
have a higher rate of time preference ( ) and they face a collateral constraint on their 
r c β β <
  9borrowing. They borrow   exclusively from domestic Ricardian households. Ricardian 
households have the possibility to refinance themselves via the international capital market.  
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Where again the shadow price of housing capital is the present discounted value of the ratio of 
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The major difference between credit constrained and Ricardian households is the presence of 
the Lagrange multiplier of the collateral constraint in both the consumption and the 
investment rule of the former. The term  t ψ  acts like premium on the interest rate which 
fluctuates positively with the tightness of the constraint. 
 
  103.2.3 Liquidity constrained households 
 
Liquidity constrained households do not optimize but simply consume their entire labour 
income at each date. Real consumption of household k is thus determined by net wage income 
plus transfers minus a lump-sum tax 
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3.2.4  Wage setting 
 
A trade union is maximising a joint utility function for each type of labour i where it is 
assumed that types of labour are distributed equally over constrained and unconstrained 
households with their respective population weights. The trade union sets wages by 
maximising a weighted average of the utility functions of these households. The wage rule is 
obtained by equating a weighted average of the marginal utility of leisure to a weighted 
average of the marginal utility of consumption times the real wage of these two household 
types, adjusted for a wage mark up   
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where   is the wage mark up factor, with wage mark ups fluctuating around 
W
t η θ / 1  which is 
the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of labour services. The 
trade union sets the consumption wage as a mark up over the reservation wage. The 
reservation wage is the ratio of the marginal utility of leisure to the marginal utility of 
consumption. This is a natural measure of the reservation wage. If this ratio is equal to the 
consumption wage, the household is indifferent between supplying an additional unit of 
labour and spending the additional income on consumption and not increasing labour supply. 
Fluctuation in the wage mark up arises because of wage adjustment costs and the fact that a 
fraction (1-sfw) of workers is indexing the growth rate of wages   to inflation in the 
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Combining (17) and (18) one can show that the (semi) elasticity of wage inflation with 
respect to the employment rate is given by ( W ) γ κ / , i. e. it is positively related to the inverse 
of the labour supply elasticity and inversely related to wage adjustment costs. 
 
  113.2.5 Aggregation 
 
The aggregate of any household specific variable   in per capita terms is given by 
since households within each group are identical. Hence 
aggregate consumption is given by 
h
t X
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and aggregate employment is given by 
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Since liquidity constrained households do not own financial assets we have 
 .Credit constrained households only engage in debt contracts with 
Ricardian households, therefore we have 




















3.3  Trade and the current account  
 
So far we have only determined aggregate consumption, investment and government 
purchases but not the allocation of expenditure over domestic and foreign goods. In order to 
facilitate aggregation we assume that households, the government and the corporate sector 
have identical preferences across goods used for private consumption, public expenditure and 
investment. Let   be demand of an individual household, investor or the 
government, and then their preferences are given by the following utility function 
{
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where the share parameter s
M can be subject to random shocks and 
i d Z  and 
i f Z  are indexes 
of demand across the continuum of differentiated goods produced respectively in the domestic 



















































































  12i d Z  and 
i f Z The elasticity of substitution between bundles of domestic and foreign goods   is 
ports are given by 
M σ . Thus aggregate im
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where 
C P  and 
M P  is the (utility based) consumer price











 deflator and the lag structure captures 
elivery lags.. We assume similar demand behaviour in the rest of the world, therefore 
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t P
,  and 
F
t Y  are the export deflator, an index of world consumer prices (in 
foreign currency) and world demand. Prices for exports and imports are set by domestic and 
foreign exporters respectively. The exporters in both regions buy goods from their respective 
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ods into 
xportables using a linear technology. Exporters act as monopolistic competitors in export 
ets and charge  mark-up over domestic prices. Thus export prices are given by 
port prices are g n by 
on of prices since a fraction of exporters (1-sfpx) and (1-sfpm) is indexing changes of 
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Exports and imports together with interest receipts/payments determine the evolution of net 




















We assume that monetary policy is partly rules based and partly discretionary. Policy 
responds to an output gap indicator of the business cycle. The output gap is not calculated as 
the difference between actual and efficient output but we try to use a measure that closely 
  13approximates the standard practice of output gap calculation as used for fiscal surveillance 
and monetary policy (see Denis et al. (2006)). Often a production function framework is used 
here the output gap is defined as deviation of capital and labour utilisation from their long 
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here   and   are moving average steady state employment rate and capacity 
ation: 
ta y policy is modelled via the following Taylor rule, which allows for some 
moothness of the interest rate response to the inflation and output gap  
(39)    
 
onsumer price inflation deviates from the target. The central bank also responds to the 
utput gap. There is also some inertia in nominal interest rate setting. There is no active fiscal 
olicy. 
.5  How sensitive is credit constrained consumption to changes in income? 
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The Central bank has a constant inflation target 
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Both temporary and permanent fiscal expansions have only a negligible effect on Ricardian 
consumers, since they respond to permanent income which is hardly affected by temporary 
fiscal measures and is likely to be zero or even negative in the case of permanent fiscal 
actions. The question arises, how do credit constrained households respond to fiscal policy? 
Since they optimise an intertemporal utility function, their consumption decisions will also be 
based on a concept of permanent income. But how does the fact that they have a higher rate of 
time preference and the fact that current changes in financial wealth are constrained by the 
value of the housing stock affect their consumption response to temporary and permanent 
income changes? In thi
  14constrained households in order to get a better understanding on the magnitude of the 
 after some algebraic manipulations and 
near approximation around the steady state, we can represent consumption and the housing 
stock as a system of two linear difference equations 





Using the first order conditions implied by the maximisation problem of credit constrained 
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λ  and  2 λ  are the roots of this system. This solution shows that indeed credit 
constrained consumers ba onsum ecisions on current as well as future expected 
income and they discount future income at rate 
se their c ption d
2 1 λ . For parameter values close to the 
estimated values we get  2 . 0 1 − = λ  and  7 . 9 2 = λ  and φ  = 1.07
7. These values are instructive 
since they show that credit constrained househ lds do indeed behave similar to liquid y 
constrained households. In particular, there is a strong response of consumption to temporary 
changes in income as indicated by the size of 
o it
φ . Also interesting is the large size of  2 λ , 
which implies that future income beyond one year do not affect current consumption 
ecisions significantly any longer. 
 




6 Since we concentrate on the response to a change in income we assume in this section an exogenous real 
interest rate. In order to make the solution more tractable we assume zero adjustment costs for residential 
investment. 
7 We use a rate of time preference of 0.04. The results are however robust to smaller values.  
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4.   Model calibration 
 
The model used in this exercise consists of two regions: the European Union and the rest of 
the world. The regions are differentiated from one another by their economic size and the 
model is calibrated on bilateral trade flows. It incorporates some of the main stylised 
differences between the EU and the rest of world, where we base our calibration on estimates 
of the model on euro area and US data. Table 1 summarises the main differences between the 
two blocks. These are, for the EU, higher transfers and unemployment benefits, higher wage 
taxes, higher price rigidities and labour adjustment costs, and a lower elasticity of labour 
supply.  
 
In terms of nominal and real rigidities, our estimates reveal clear differences which are 
largely consistent with prior expectations and other empirical evidence. This is most clear 
when it comes to price adjustment rigidities. European firms keep prices fixed for more 
quarters than US firms. Our estimates suggest that the duration of wage spells in the US is 
similar to those in the EA. There are however significant differences in the labour supply 
elasticity. A significantly higher elasticity in the US translates into a smaller response in US 
wages to changes in employment
8. Another estimation result that coincides well with a priori 
beliefs on employment protection are higher labour adjustment costs in the EU. According to 
these estimates, administrative costs of increasing employment amount to about 13% of total 
additional wage costs in the EA and only 10% in the US. There is less evidence on 
differences in capital adjustment costs. Concerning financial market frictions, we assume 40 
percent of households to be liquidity-constrained, which corresponds closely to our estimates 
(Ratto et al. (2009). We have little knowledge on the share of credit-constrained households 
and we assume in our benchmark model (CC) half of the non-liquidity constrained 
households to be credit-constrained. We compare this to an alternative model RIC where the 
credit-constrained group is shifted to the non-constrained Ricardian group and the ratios 
liquidity constrained–credit constrained–non constrained are 40-0-60. This allows us to focus 
on the impact the introduction of credit-constrained households makes in the response of the 
private sector to the fiscal expansions. The loan-to-value ratio (1-χ) is set at 0.75 for both 
regions, calibrated to fit a mortgage debt ratio as share of GDP on the baseline of around 50 
percent. The estimated Taylor rules do not point to sizeable differences in monetary policy 
behaviour and we set these parameters identical.  
 
Another important stylised fact is the difference between the EU and the US in the generosity 
of the transfer system. The share of government transfers to households is higher in the Euro 
area than in the US. The main difference are a more generous unemployment benefit system 
and a higher emphasis on PAYG pension schemes in the EU. Apart from the generosity 
difference there is also a difference in benefit-and pension entitlements because of a higher 
unemployment rate and a higher old age dependency ratio in the EU compared to the US.  
 
                                                 
8 This is consistent with our  Phillips curve estimates which also show a stronger response of wage inflation to 
unemployment in the Euro area compared to the US. 
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Table 1:  Model calibration 
 
 EU  US 
Nom. Rigidities: 
Avg. duration between price adjustments (Quarters)  5.5  5 
Avg. wage contract length (Quarters)  4.5  4.5 
 
Real Rigidities: 
Labour adjustment cost (% of total add. wage costs) ( ) L γ   13 10 
Labour supply elasticity (1/κ ) 1/5  1/3 
Semi-wage elasticity w.r.t. employment rate ( ) / w γ κ   0.33 0.20 
Capital adjustment cost ( ) K γ   20 20 
Investment adjustment cost ( ) I γ   75 75 
 
Consumption: 
Share of liquidity-constrained consumers  s
l 0.4  0.4 
Share of credit-constrained consumers s
c  0.3 (CC)   
0 (RIC) 
0.3 (CC)  
0 (RIC) 
Share of non-constrained consumers s




Downpayment rate χ 0.25  0.25 
Habit persistence  h 0.7  0.7 
 
Monetary policy: 
Lagged interest rate   
INOM
lag τ 0.85 0.85 
Consumer price inflation  
INOM
π τ 1.5 1.5 
Output gap   
INOM
Y τ 0.05 0.05 
 
National accounts decomposition: 
Consumption    0.59  0.64 
Investment tradedables   0.06  0.05 
Investment non-tradables   0.07  0.06 
Investment residential  0.06  0.06 
Government consumption   0.18  0.15 
Government investment   0.04  0.04 
Exports   0.18  0.15 
Imports   0.18  0.15 
Transfers to households  0.16  0.13 
    
  175.   Fiscal shocks  
 
We use the model to examine different types of fiscal expansions. First we examine the 
difference the introduction of credit constrained households makes on the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy. We do this both for temporary fiscal shocks (section 5.1) and for permanent 
fiscal shocks (5.2). This will show the importance of credibility for temporary fiscal 
measures, and highlight the difference higher future tax liabilities makes on the size of fiscal 
multipliers. Next we consider the difference between fiscal expansions in one region (acting 
alone) versus an expansion in both regions together (global). This shows the size of 
spillovers of fiscal stimuli in one country on the other region and the benefits of coordination. 




5.1 Temporary fiscal shocks 
 
We first examine the difference the introduction of credit constraints has made in the model 
by comparing the model with credit constraints (CC) with the model that excludes this group 
(RIC). In this section we show temporary (one year) global fiscal shocks applied to both 
regions together and standardised to 1 per cent of (baseline) GDP. The fiscal policy variables 
considered are government consumption (unproductive), government investment 
(productive), transfers to households, labour taxes and consumption taxes. The fiscal rule that 
returns the debt to GDP ratio to baseline levels is turned off for the first year to allow us to 
see the impact of the shock on budget balances, but from the second year onwards labour 
taxes are raised to return the debt to GDP ratio to baseline. Hence, these scenarios are 
budgetary neutral in the medium run.  
 
The first scenario shown in Figure 1 is a temporary increase in government consumption of 1 
per cent of GDP for one year. The results shown are for the EU, and detailed tables can be 
found in the annex. This temporary impulse raises GDP by 1 per cent in the model with 
credit constraints CC model and 0.95 per cent in the model without (RIC). The main 
difference between the two model variants is the response of private consumption. In the RIC 
model, private consumption falls in response to the increase in public consumption, a well 
documented feature of many DSGE models
9. This seems at first sight in conflict with the 
findings of Gali et al. (2007), who show that allowing for a fraction of liquidity constrained 
consumers exceeding 25 per cent, a model with sticky prices can account for a positive 
consumption response to a government spending shock. But their result depends crucially on 
the assumed labour adjustment cost parameter  L γ . Gali et al. assume no nominal wage 
rigidities and no labour adjustment costs. However, empirical estimates show these 
parameters to be significantly different from zero. A sensitivity analysis in Ratto et al. (2009) 
shows that when these parameters tend to zero (as assumed in Gali et al (2007)), the 
consumption response to a government spending shocks tends to become positive in our 
model too
10. Interestingly, in the model with credit-constrained households, there is a 
positive co-movement between public and private consumption even with non-zero labour 
adjustment costs. This is completely driven by the response of consumption by credit 
constrained households, who act more like liquidity-constrained households in response to 
                                                 
9 See e.g. Coenen and Straub (2007). 
10  The economic interpretation of this result is simple. Negligible wage and labour adjustment costs imply a 
stronger positive short run impact of an increase in government consumption on labour income and therefore a 
stronger response of private consumption. 
  18temporary government consumption shocks and raise their consumption. Residential 
investment falls due to the increase in real interest rates.  
 
A temporary increase in investment has very similar effects. The GDP effect is slightly larger 
he GDP effect of temporary increases in transfers are roughly half those of other spending 
he GDP effect of temporary reductions in labour taxes are very similar to those of an 
inally, temporary reductions in consumption taxes have a larger effect on GDP than 
 all these scenarios the deterioration in government balances is less than 1 percentage 
points. However, it is generally larger for tax shocks than expenditure shocks (see results 
                                                
and remains slightly positive in the medium term, as public capital is assumed to be 
productive and depreciates only slowly. Higher growth in the medium term boosts 
consumption and consumption by non-constrained households falls by less compared to the 
government consumption shock. Consumption by credit and liquidity constrained households 
is somewhat higher as real wages remain higher for longer, reflecting the productivity gains 
from higher public capital. It should be borne in mind that the size of the difference relative 
to the shock to government consumption depends crucially on the assumed output elasticity 
of public investment. 
 
T
increases, with a higher increase in savings (see Table A1 in annex). There is however a 
significant difference between the two alternative models. In the model without credit 
constrained households, GDP rises by only 0.3 per cent, while the increase is twice as large 
in the model with credit constraints. Ricardian, non-constrained households hardly respond to 
the temporary increase in transfers, but credit constraint households respond more similarly 
to liquidity constrained households and raise their consumption. Credit constrained 
households have a higher marginal propensity to consume out of transitory increases in 
transfers, and the increase in aggregate consumption is twice as large in this model. 
Corporate investment is down by more in the model with credit constraints as real interest 
rates rise by more. Housing investment by Ricardian unconstrained households does not 
change much, but credit constrained households can raise their housing investment after the 
increase in transfers.  
 
T
increase in transfers. The multiplier is smaller than for spending shocks, roughly half. But 
like for transfers, there is a significant difference between the two models. The presence of 
credit constrained households raises the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory tax 
reductions, and hence makes fiscal policy a more powerful tool for short run stabilisation.  
The effects are twice as large in the model with credit constraints than in the model without. 
The main difference is in the wage response, with real wages falling in case of a labour tax 
reduction, and rising in case of a transfer shock. The fall in real wages is however smaller in 
the model with credit constraints due to higher consumption (wealth effect).  
 
F
temporary reductions in wage taxes. The difference is due to the response of Ricardian non-
constrained households who in this case also raise their consumption in response to the 
change in intertemporal prices (when the shock comes off and VAT is raised back to baseline 
level). The same applies to housing investment which increases by more. As real interest 
rates increase, firms reduce their corporate investment. The difference between the two 
models is not as large as in the case of the labour tax reduction, but it is still sizeable, with 





11 Note that under a less than complete pass-through into consumer prices, multipliers could be lower.  
  19reported in Table A1 in the annex). The degree of self-financing ranges from 0.35 to 0.55 and 
is roughly in line with the growth effects of the fiscal stimulus, with the automatic stabilisers 





5.2 Permanent fiscal shocks 
 an effective stabilisation tool when used as a temporary 
strument, the effects of permanent changes in spending and taxes are much smaller, and, 
s the effects in the EU of a permanent increase in government consumption. 
onsumption of Ricardian non-constrained households declines, as does credit constrained 
 effects of a permanent increase in (productive) government investment, 
nanced by labour taxes. Under the standard assumption in the model, the productivity 
                                                
 
While fiscal policy can be
in
when financed by increases in labour taxes, generally become negative in the long run. This 
is shown in the following set of figures (Fig. 6-10) of scenarios of permanent increases in 
spending or reductions in taxes financed in the medium/long run by increases in labour taxes. 






consumption. Consumption of liquidity constrained households rises slightly on impact, but 
falls in the medium run as employment declines due to higher taxes. The overall GDP effect 
is positive in the first years but turns negative in later years as taxes are raised and 
employment falls.  
 
Figure 7 shows the
fi
enhancing effect of a permanently higher public capital stock is large enough to more than 
offset the negative impact of labour taxes and output is higher in the long run (by almost 3 
per cent in the steady state). Consumption declines in the short run, but eventually becomes 
positive as higher growth raises permanent incomes.  The short run impact of this shock is 
higher in the model with credit constraints than without, largely due to the fact that 
consumption falls by less in this model. The long run output effect of government investment 
shocks depends crucially on the assumed output elasticity of public capital. Unfortunately, 
there is much uncertainty about the productive impact of infrastructure investment and 
econometric studies show large variation in estimates, depending on how care is taken of 
common trends, missing variables, simultaneity bias and reverse causation
14. The benchmark 
assumption in the model is that the rate of return on public capital equals that of private 
capital (cfr. Gramlich (1994), p.1187). However, this assumption may be too optimistic as it 
is questionable whether all public investment projects are as productive as private 
investment. The lower the productivity effect, the lower will be the long run GDP effect, with 
as lower bound the effect of a tax-financed increase in (unproductive) government 
 
12 For analytical reasons other expenditure components are kept exogenous in the simulations to isolate the 
effects of the expenditure shock considered and not to combine it with effects of other shocks. If transfers were 
indexed to inflation, the degree of self-financing would be lower. 
13 The fiscal rule that returns the debt to GDP ratio to baseline levels is turned off for the first year to see the 
impact of the shock on budget balances, but from the second year onwards (distortionary) labour taxes are raised 
to finance the expansion. 
14 For an overview see e.g the surveys by Gramlich (1994), Romp and de Haan (2005).  
  20consumption (see Figure 11).  The output effect of a government investment shock lies 
probably somewhere in between these two lines 
15. 
 
Permanent  increases in transfers (Fig. 8) have almost no positive GDP impact in the model 
without credit constraints as the decline in Ricardian non-constrained consumption (in 
response to  higher tax liabilities) offsets the increase in consumption by liquidity 
constrainted households. In the model with credit constraints, those households respond more 
akin to liquidity constrained households and overall consumption is higher on impact. In the 
long run however, there is not much difference and GDP declines in both variants. 
  
The scenario shown in Fig.9 is a shock to labour taxes of 1 percent of GDP (a roughly 1.5 
percentage point reduction in the tax rate). But from the second year onwards taxes are raised 
again gradually to return the debt-to-GDP ratio to baseline, and eventually have to be raised 
to pay for the higher interest burden. Hence, the scenario shows the effect of a temporary tax 
reduction that is gradually phased-out. It has positive output and employment effects in the 
short run, and these are larger in the model with credit constrained households.  
 
Finally, Fig. 10 shows the effects of a permanent reduction in consumption taxes (roughly 
1.6 percentage points). As this shock is permanent, it does not affect intertemporal prices and 
unlike in the case of a temporary shock, Ricardian non-constrained households do not react 
to this. But they do face higher future labour taxes financing this VAT reduction. They 
respond to this reduction in permanent income by reducing their consumption. Liquidity 
constrained households raise their consumption as consumer prices fall, and so do credit 
constrained households (they are more impatient and have a higher discount rate). The short 




5.3 Spillover effects of temporary fiscal shocks 
 
 
The fiscal shocks discussed in the previous section were global expansions in both regions. 
To show the importance of the spillover effects, Table 2 below shows the difference between 
global expansions in both regions and fiscal expansions in one region alone, in the model that 
includes credit constrained households (CC). The table shows the first year GDP effects for 
the same standardised temporary (one year) fiscal shocks, in the first column for a shock in 
the EU, in the second column in rest of the world, and in the third column for a global shock 
in both regions together (as discussed in section 5.1). Government spending shocks have 
higher fiscal multipliers than revenue shocks, and the effects of (productive) government 
investment shocks are slightly higher than consumption shocks. Fiscal multipliers for 
transfers and wage tax shocks are the lowest. Spillovers of a fiscal expansion in the EU to the 
rest of the world are around 10 percent, while the reversed spillovers of a shock in the other 
region to the EU are somewhat larger, reflecting the difference in size and trade openness. 
Multipliers are generally smaller in the EU due to higher nominal and real rigidities and 
benefit and transfer generosity.  
                                                 
15 Varga and in 't Veld (2008) show a sensitivity analysis with respect to the output elasticity for the GDP impact 
of Structural and Cohesion Funds in this model. The GDP impact depends heavily on this elasticity, even tough 
in that case investment is not tax-financed, but financed by fiscal transfers received from the EU.  
  21Table 2  First year GDP effects of temporary fiscal shocks of 1% of GDP 
 
  EU   RoW   Global 
Government consumption       
EU GDP  0.74  0.26  0.99 
RoW GDP  0.09  0.96  1.04 
 
Government investment 
    
EU GDP  0.84  0.24  1.07 
RoW GDP  0.08  1.04  1.12 
 
Government transfers 
    
EU GDP  0.40  0.15  0.55 
RoW GDP  0.05  0.53  0.58 
 
Labour tax 
    
EU GDP  0.41  0.12  0.53 
RoW GDP  0.04  0.52  0.56 
 
Consumption tax 
    
EU GDP  0.49  0.18  0.67 
RoW GDP 
 
0.06 0.64  0.70 
Note: GDP difference from baseline in first year of simulation, for resp. EU acting alone, RoW acting alone and 





5.4 Sensitivity analysis 
 
The size of the fiscal multiplier depends on a range of factors. First, the design of the fiscal 
policy is important. As shown here, the duration of the shocks plays a key role, and fiscal 
policy is most effective if it is credibly temporary. The assumption on how the fiscal stimulus 
is financed in the long run is also important. Multipliers would be higher under financing by 
lump-sum taxes but this would in the real world be a less viable option. The multipliers 
shown here assume financing in the long run through distortionary wage taxes. Real effects 
could be larger under alternative financing assumptions.  
 
The role of monetary policy is also crucial. Empirical studies that hold interest rates constant 
show larger multipliers than studies that allow for interest rate responses by central banks. At 
the present juncture with sharp falls in output and no significant inflationary risks, central 
banks might be more accommodative and respond less strongly to fiscal stimulus packages, 
and the scenarios reported here assumed lower response parameters than estimated on euro 
area data. As a result, in the scenarios described above, there are no large interest rate 
increases in response to the fiscal stimulus. But in order to show the sensitivity of the results 
to the monetary policy assumption, we compare the results in the table below to an 
alternative assumption of a fully accommodative monetary policy, in which interest rates are 
kept unchanged in the first year when the stimulus occurs, and resume to the normal response 
in the years thereafter. As can be seen in Table 3, this raises the fiscal multipliers for all 
shocks considerably. The fiscal stimulus is only for one year, and monetary policy does not 
react to the increase in inflation in that year or to the resulting increase in the price level. 
There is a sharp fall in the real interest rate and this increases aggregate demand. The fiscal 
stimulus in one single region is also accompanied by a depreciation of the exchange rate 
  22which boosts trade in the country concerned, but reduces the spillover effects to the other 
region. Under this accommodative monetary stance, a coordinated global fiscal expansion 
has also larger multipliers, ranging from 0.7 for tax reductions to 1.5 for spending increases. 
 
 
Table 3  First year GDP effects of temporary fiscal shocks under accommodative monetary 
policy 
  EU   RoW   Global 
Government consumption       
EU GDP  1.23  0.08  1.40 
RoW GDP  0.04  1.48  1.52 
 
Government investment 
    
EU GDP  1.26  0.09  1.40 
RoW GDP  0.04  1.48  1.52 
 
Government transfers 
    
EU GDP  0.69  0.04  0.78 
RoW GDP  0.02  0.85  0.87 
 
Labour tax 
    
EU GDP  0.60  0.05  0.68 
RoW GDP  0.02  0.74  0.76 
 
Consumption tax 
    
EU GDP  0.87  0.04  0.99 
RoW GDP 
 
0.02 1.07  1.10 
Note: GDP difference from baseline in first year of simulation, for resp. EU acting alone, RoW acting alone and 
global coordinated expansions. All shocks are temporary for one year and of equal size, 1% of baseline GDP. 




6.   Conclusions 
 
The current financial crisis has renewed interest in discretionary fiscal policy. This paper has 
shown that fiscal policy can be more effective at the current juncture with higher credit 
constraints and a sharp and prolonged fall in demand. Our analysis can be summarised as 
follows. First, temporary fiscal policy shocks can have sizeable effects. These effects are larger 
for spending shocks (government consumption and investment) than for transfers and tax 
reductions. Of the latter, a larger share ends up as an increase in the savings rate. Second, the 
introduction of credit-constrained households raises the multiplier for transfer and tax shocks, 
almost doubling the impact when half the Ricardian households are assumed to be in fact 
credit-constrained. This suggests that at the present juncture, with a tightening of credit 
constraints as a result of the financial crisis, fiscal policy might be more effective than in the 
past. Third, permanent shocks have much smaller impacts as the anticipatory effects of larger 
tax liabilities weigh heavier. In the medium to long run, the GDP effects can become negative 
as the distortionary effects of higher taxes come to dominate. Fourth, the introduction of credit-
constrained households also raises the multiplier for permanent transfer and tax shocks, but the 
GDP effects are smaller. The long run effects are not affected by the introduction of credit 
constraints in the model. Fifth, the large difference between temporary and permanent fiscal 
shocks means it is of crucial importance that temporary tax shocks do not become permanent, 
and that this policy is credible. Sixth, spillover effects of fiscal shocks are positive, and effects 
  23of a joint fiscal stimulus are larger than when acting alone. And finally, the response of 
monetary policy to a fiscal stimulus matters. Fiscal multipliers are higher under a more 
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Figure 6  Permanent increase government consumption – tax financed 
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Consumption: Non-constrained and credit constrained hh.
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Housing investment: Non-constrained and credit constrained hh
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Consumption: liquidity-constrained hh.
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Consumption: Non-constrained and credit constrained hh.











CC_IHOUSENLC RI C_I HOUSE NL C CC_IHOUSECC
Housing investment: Non-constrained and credit constrained hh
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Consumption: Non-constrained and credit constrained hh.









Housing investment: Non-constrained and credit constrained hh







































































Note: percentage difference from baseline. Permanent tax-financed increases in (unproductive) government 
consumption and (productive) government investment.
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Table A1: Macro-economic impact on EU of temporary one year global fiscal stimuli of 1% of GDP 
 
Government consumption  
                                  1      2       3       4       5         10      20 
 
GDP                             0.99   -0.07   -0.07   -0.06   -0.04     -0.02   -0.02 
EMPLOYMENT                      0.88    0.02   -0.09   -0.06   -0.04     -0.02   -0.02 
CONSUMPTION                     0.03   -0.05   -0.07   -0.07   -0.06     -0.04   -0.03 
.CLC                            0.33    0.12   -0.05   -0.11   -0.13     -0.09   -0.06 
.CCC                            0.10   -0.01   -0.10   -0.13   -0.13     -0.09   -0.06 
.CNLC                          -0.17   -0.16   -0.08   -0.02    0.00      0.01   -0.00 
INVESTMENT                     -0.31   -0.34   -0.21   -0.10   -0.04      0.00   -0.01 
INVESTMENT.HOUSE               -0.08   -0.05    0.01    0.05    0.07      0.04   -0.01 
.INVESTMENT.H.CC               -0.07   -0.07   -0.07   -0.07   -0.06     -0.05   -0.06 
.INVESTMENT.H.NLC              -0.08   -0.05    0.03    0.08    0.10      0.06   -0.00 
EXPORTS                         1.90   -0.26   -0.07   -0.07   -0.05     -0.03   -0.03 
IMPORTS                         1.78   -0.34   -0.07   -0.05   -0.04     -0.02   -0.02 
REAL WAGES                      0.22    0.26    0.09    0.01   -0.01     -0.00   -0.00 
NET REAL CONS WAGES             0.22    0.22    0.02   -0.08   -0.11     -0.09   -0.09 
TERMS OF TRADE                 -0.02   -0.01   -0.00    0.00    0.00      0.00    0.00 
 
NOM.INT.RATE                    0.19    0.10    0.04    0.01   -0.01     -0.01   -0.01 
REAL.INT.RATE                   0.12    0.11    0.04    0.02    0.01     -0.00   -0.00 
INFL                            0.22   -0.05   -0.00   -0.01   -0.01     -0.01   -0.01 
GOV.DEBT(%GDP)                 -0.34    0.53    0.59    0.60    0.59      0.44    0.32 
GOV.BALANCE(%GDP)              -0.47   -0.07   -0.05   -0.01    0.01      0.02    0.01 
CURRENT.ACC.(%GDP)              0.01    0.01    0.00   -0.00   -0.00      0.00    0.00 
PRIV.INV. (%GDP)               -0.24   -0.04   -0.02   -0.00    0.01      0.01    0.00 




                                  1      2       3       4       5        10      20 
 
GDP                             1.07    0.06    0.08    0.10    0.11     0.11    0.07 
EMPLOYMENT                      0.86    0.01   -0.07   -0.04   -0.02     0.01    0.00 
CONSUMPTION                     0.11    0.08    0.09    0.10    0.11     0.12    0.09 
.CLC                            0.35    0.19    0.07    0.05    0.05     0.12    0.10 
.CCC                            0.18    0.10    0.06    0.05    0.07     0.13    0.10 
.CNLC                          -0.06    0.02    0.11    0.15    0.16     0.12    0.08 
INVESTMENT                     -0.14   -0.03    0.13    0.22    0.26     0.19    0.09 
INVESTMENT.HOUSE                0.04    0.12    0.18    0.19    0.19     0.10   -0.00 
.INVESTMENT.H.CC                0.06    0.10    0.10    0.10    0.10     0.10    0.02 
.INVESTMENT.H.NLC               0.03    0.13    0.19    0.22    0.21     0.09   -0.01 
EXPORTS                         1.95   -0.16    0.08    0.08    0.10     0.10    0.06 
IMPORTS                         1.84   -0.23    0.07    0.09    0.10     0.10    0.07 
REAL WAGES                      0.25    0.32    0.19    0.13    0.11     0.09    0.06 
NET REAL CONS WAGES             0.25    0.29    0.15    0.10    0.09     0.14    0.08 
TERMS OF TRADE                 -0.02   -0.01   -0.00    0.00    0.00    -0.00    0.00 
 
NOM.INT.RATE                    0.16    0.06    0.00   -0.02   -0.02    -0.02   -0.01 
REAL.INT.RATE                   0.15    0.09    0.02    0.00   -0.01    -0.01   -0.00 
INFL                            0.17   -0.08   -0.02   -0.02   -0.02    -0.01   -0.00 
GOV.DEBT(%GDP)                 -0.39    0.42    0.41    0.38    0.33     0.16    0.19 
GOV.BALANCE(%GDP)              -0.44   -0.01    0.01    0.04    0.05     0.02   -0.01 
CURRENT.ACC.(%GDP)              0.01    0.01    0.00   -0.00    0.00     0.00    0.00 
PRIV.INV.(%GDP)                -0.22   -0.01    0.01    0.02    0.03     0.01    0.00 




  37Government transfers 
                                 1      2       3       4       5       10      20 
 
GDP                             0.55   -0.04   -0.05   -0.04   -0.03   -0.02   -0.03 
EMPLOYMENT                      0.48    0.01   -0.06   -0.04   -0.03   -0.02   -0.03 
CONSUMPTION                     0.92   -0.02   -0.05   -0.05   -0.05   -0.04   -0.04 
.CLC                            1.90    0.09   -0.04   -0.09   -0.10   -0.10   -0.09 
.CCC                            1.97   -0.00   -0.07   -0.10   -0.11   -0.10   -0.09 
.CNLC                          -0.09   -0.09   -0.04   -0.01    0.01    0.02    0.01 
INVESTMENT                     -0.20   -0.23   -0.16   -0.09   -0.04   -0.00   -0.01 
INVESTMENT.HOUSE                0.06    0.00    0.01    0.03    0.04    0.02   -0.01 
.INVESTMENT.H.CC                0.56    0.15   -0.05   -0.08   -0.09   -0.09   -0.09 
.INVESTMENT.H.NLC              -0.05   -0.03    0.02    0.05    0.07    0.05    0.01 
EXPORTS                         1.07   -0.12   -0.04   -0.05   -0.04   -0.03   -0.03 
IMPORTS                         0.97   -0.19   -0.05   -0.04   -0.03   -0.02   -0.02 
REAL WAGES                      0.17    0.18    0.07    0.01   -0.01   -0.00    0.00 
NET REAL CONS WAGES             0.17    0.16    0.01   -0.07   -0.10   -0.11   -0.11 
TERMS OF TRADE                 -0.02   -0.01   -0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
 
NOM.INT.RATE                    0.11    0.07    0.03    0.01   -0.00     -0.01   -0.01 
REAL.INT.RATE                   0.06    0.07    0.03    0.01    0.00     -0.00   -0.00 
INFL                            0.14   -0.02    0.00   -0.01   -0.01     -0.01   -0.01 
GOV.DEBT(%GDP)                  0.03    0.65    0.69    0.71    0.71      0.60    0.44 
GOV.BALANCE(%GDP)              -0.62   -0.06   -0.05   -0.02   -0.00      0.01    0.01 
CURRENT.ACC.(%GDP)              0.01    0.01    0.00   -0.00   -0.00      0.00    0.00 
PRIV.INV.(%GDP)                -0.13   -0.03   -0.01   -0.00    0.00      0.01    0.00 





                                  1      2       3       4       5       10      20 
 
GDP                             0.53   -0.02   -0.01   -0.01   -0.01   -0.02   -0.02 
EMPLOYMENT                      0.49    0.04   -0.01   -0.01   -0.01   -0.02   -0.03 
CONSUMPTION                     0.87   -0.03   -0.02   -0.02   -0.02   -0.03   -0.04 
.CLC                            1.76   -0.01   -0.04   -0.05   -0.06   -0.09   -0.09 
.CCC                            1.84   -0.07   -0.05   -0.06   -0.06   -0.09   -0.09 
.CNLC                          -0.05   -0.03    0.01    0.02    0.02    0.02    0.02 
INVESTMENT                     -0.11   -0.09   -0.04   -0.02   -0.01   -0.01   -0.01 
INVESTMENT.HOUSE                0.08    0.02    0.01    0.02    0.02    0.02   -0.00 
.INVESTMENT.H.CC                0.53    0.13   -0.05   -0.07   -0.08   -0.09   -0.09 
.INVESTMENT.H.NLC              -0.02    0.00    0.02    0.04    0.04    0.04    0.02 
EXPORTS                         0.99   -0.14   -0.01   -0.02   -0.02   -0.03   -0.03 
IMPORTS                         0.89   -0.21   -0.03   -0.01   -0.01   -0.02   -0.02 
REAL WAGES                     -0.05    0.01    0.01    0.01    0.01    0.01    0.00 
NET REAL CONS WAGES             2.38   -0.02   -0.04   -0.05   -0.06   -0.10   -0.12 
TERMS OF TRADE                 -0.02   -0.01   -0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
 
NOM.INT.RATE                    0.08    0.02    0.01    0.00    0.00   -0.00   -0.00 
REAL.INT.RATE                   0.08    0.04    0.00    0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00 
INFL                            0.07   -0.04    0.01    0.00    0.00   -0.00   -0.00 
GOV.DEBT(%GDP)                  0.06    0.68    0.70    0.70    0.70    0.65    0.49 
GOV.BALANCE(%GDP)              -0.63   -0.04   -0.03   -0.02   -0.01    0.00    0.01 
CURRENT.ACC.(%GDP)              0.01    0.01    0.00    0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00 
PRIV.INV.(%GDP)                -0.11   -0.01   -0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00 
SAVINGS(%GDP)                   0.53    0.04    0.03    0.02    0.01    0.00   -0.01 
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                                  1      2       3       4       5        10      20 
 
GDP                             0.67    0.10   -0.02   -0.04   -0.03    -0.02   -0.02 
EMPLOYMENT                      0.62    0.17   -0.02   -0.04   -0.03    -0.01   -0.02 
CONSUMPTION                     1.11    0.20    0.01   -0.04   -0.04    -0.03   -0.03 
.CLC                            1.59    0.15    0.02   -0.06   -0.09    -0.08   -0.07 
.CCC                            1.51    0.01   -0.04   -0.09   -0.10    -0.09   -0.07 
.CNLC                           0.66    0.32    0.03   -0.00    0.01     0.02    0.02 
INVESTMENT                     -0.27   -0.36   -0.25   -0.14   -0.06     0.01   -0.00 
INVESTMENT.HOUSE                0.82    0.41    0.10    0.03    0.01    -0.02   -0.06 
.INVESTMENT.H.CC                1.58    0.50   -0.02   -0.10   -0.11    -0.11   -0.12 
.INVESTMENT.H.NLC               0.64    0.38    0.13    0.06    0.04     0.00   -0.04 
EXPORTS                         1.21    0.07   -0.01   -0.05   -0.05    -0.03   -0.02 
IMPORTS                         1.09   -0.03   -0.03   -0.04   -0.03    -0.02   -0.01 
REAL WAGES                      0.12    0.20    0.11    0.03   -0.01    -0.01   -0.00 
NET REAL CONS WAGES             1.55    0.21    0.10   -0.01   -0.05    -0.07   -0.08 
TERMS OF TRADE                 -0.02   -0.02   -0.01   -0.00    0.00     0.00    0.00 
 
NOM.INT.RATE                    0.14    0.11    0.05    0.02    0.00     -0.01   -0.01 
REAL.INT.RATE                   0.04    0.11    0.06    0.03    0.01     -0.00   -0.00 
INFL                            0.18   -0.01    0.00   -0.01   -0.01     -0.01   -0.01 
GOV.DEBT(%GDP)                 -0.04    0.47    0.56    0.61    0.61      0.52    0.40 
GOV.BALANCE(%GDP)              -0.62    0.03   -0.04   -0.03   -0.01      0.01    0.01 
CURRENT.ACC.(%GDP)              0.01    0.01    0.00    0.00   -0.00      0.00    0.00 
PRIV.INV.(%GDP)                -0.11   -0.04   -0.02   -0.01   -0.00      0.00    0.00 




Note: Top half of each table percentage difference from baseline, bottom half percentage point 
difference from baseline. 
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Table A2:  Macro-economic impact on EU of permanent global fiscal stimuli of 1% of GDP 
 
Government consumption  
                            1      2       3       4       5         10      20 
 
 
GDP                        0.36    0.06   -0.12   -0.23   -0.32      -0.75   -1.15 
EMPLOYMENT                 0.33    0.07   -0.12   -0.24   -0.34      -0.80   -1.21 
CONSUMPTION               -0.90   -1.25   -1.49   -1.67   -1.82      -2.54   -3.17 
.CLC                       0.10   -0.18   -0.61   -1.01   -1.37      -2.90   -4.14 
.CCC                      -1.16   -0.56   -0.76   -1.09   -1.42      -2.99   -4.24 
.CNLC                     -1.34   -2.15   -2.30   -2.30   -2.26      -2.13   -2.15 
INVESTMENT                -0.57   -1.04   -1.20   -1.22   -1.20      -1.09   -1.08 
INVESTMENT.HOUSE          -1.17   -1.61   -1.54   -1.41   -1.31      -1.02   -0.92 
.INVESTMENT.H.CC          -0.97   -0.67   -0.48   -0.59   -0.80      -2.05   -2.89 
.INVESTMENT.H.NLC         -1.21   -1.82   -1.78   -1.60   -1.42      -0.79   -0.47 
EXPORTS                    0.89    0.38    0.17    0.02   -0.10      -0.60   -1.01 
IMPORTS                    0.49   -0.03   -0.18   -0.26   -0.32      -0.59   -0.83 
REAL WAGES                 0.08    0.14    0.12    0.09    0.09       0.16    0.18 
NET REAL CONS WAGES        0.08   -0.17   -0.69   -1.18   -1.62      -3.50   -5.01 
TERMS OF TRADE            -0.07   -0.06   -0.05   -0.04   -0.02       0.04    0.11 
 
NOM.INT.RATE               0.14    0.18    0.17    0.15    0.14       0.07    0.01 
REAL.INT.RATE             -0.03    0.06    0.06    0.05    0.04       0.01   -0.01 
INFL                       0.21    0.13    0.12    0.11    0.10       0.07    0.02 
TAX LAB.                   0.00    0.19    0.50    0.79    1.06       2.28    3.25 
GOV.DEBT(%GDP)             0.29    1.42    2.49    3.44    4.28       7.42    8.20 
GOV.BALANCE(%GDP)         -0.92   -1.08   -1.05   -0.96   -0.87      -0.45   -0.05 
CURRENT.ACC(%GDP)          0.04    0.05    0.04    0.04    0.03       0.02    0.01 
PRIV.INV(%GDP)            -0.26   -0.32   -0.31   -0.29   -0.26      -0.16   -0.09 




                            1      2       3       4       5          10      20 
 
GDP                        0.84    0.54    0.40    0.38    0.41       0.82    1.54 
EMPLOYMENT                 0.70    0.34    0.04   -0.11   -0.17      -0.30   -0.18 
CONSUMPTION               -0.01   -0.26   -0.45   -0.53   -0.55      -0.32    0.49 
.CLC                       0.34    0.27   -0.09   -0.42   -0.66      -1.00   -0.17 
.CCC                       0.54    0.17   -0.33   -0.67   -0.88      -1.13   -0.19 
.CNLC                     -0.46   -0.75   -0.70   -0.54   -0.35       0.43    1.16 
INVESTMENT                -0.95   -1.75   -1.87   -1.67   -1.37       0.15    1.49 
INVESTMENT.HOUSE          -0.84   -1.48   -1.56   -1.38   -1.13       0.07    0.93 
.INVESTMENT.H.CC          -0.69   -1.37   -1.71   -1.85   -1.89      -1.54   -0.35 
.INVESTMENT.H.NLC         -0.88   -1.51   -1.52   -1.28   -0.96       0.43    1.22 
EXPORTS                    1.48    0.80    0.57    0.48    0.48       0.81    1.51 
IMPORTS                    1.35    0.66    0.52    0.51    0.55       0.93    1.56 
REAL WAGES                 0.38    0.72    0.75    0.74    0.77       1.21    1.71 
NET REAL CONS WAGES        0.37    0.53    0.23   -0.11   -0.36      -0.61    0.48 
TERMS OF TRADE            -0.02   -0.02   -0.01    0.01    0.02       0.04    0.02 
 
NOM.INT.RATE               0.33    0.47    0.46    0.39    0.33       0.14    0.00 
REAL.INT.RATE             -0.13    0.16    0.21    0.20    0.17       0.09    0.05 
INFL                       0.55    0.34    0.26    0.21    0.17       0.05   -0.05 
TAX LAB.                   0.00    0.12    0.32    0.53    0.70       1.12    0.76 
GOV.DEBT(%GDP)            -0.26    0.43    1.19    1.82    2.30       2.88    0.63 
GOV.BALANCE(%GDP)         -0.59   -0.83   -0.84   -0.74   -0.59      -0.02    0.24 
CURRENT.ACC(%GDP)          0.01    0.02    0.01   -0.00   -0.00      -0.01   -0.01 
PRIV.INV(%GDP)            -0.34   -0.43   -0.42   -0.38   -0.33      -0.14   -0.03 
SAVINGS(%GDP)              0.26    0.42    0.43    0.36    0.26      -0.13   -0.28 
 
  40Government transfers  
                            1      2       3       4       5         10      20 
 
GDP                        0.22   -0.04   -0.22   -0.34   -0.43     -0.84   -1.21 
EMPLOYMENT                 0.19   -0.06   -0.25   -0.38   -0.47     -0.90   -1.26 
CONSUMPTION                0.47    0.18   -0.06   -0.25   -0.40     -1.07   -1.66 
.CLC                       1.78    1.54    1.12    0.73    0.38     -1.08   -2.22 
.CCC                       1.50    1.49    1.11    0.73    0.38     -1.13   -2.29 
.CNLC                     -0.72   -1.17   -1.25   -1.22   -1.18     -1.05   -1.07 
INVESTMENT                -0.59   -1.11   -1.29   -1.31   -1.29     -1.17   -1.15 
INVESTMENT.HOUSE          -0.50   -0.80   -0.82   -0.76   -0.69     -0.45   -0.39 
.INVESTMENT.H.CC           0.63    1.00    0.90    0.67    0.41     -0.79   -1.59 
.INVESTMENT.H.NLC         -0.76   -1.21   -1.21   -1.09   -0.95     -0.38   -0.12 
EXPORTS                    0.63    0.24    0.01   -0.15   -0.28     -0.76   -1.14 
IMPORTS                    0.26   -0.17   -0.33   -0.42   -0.48     -0.75   -0.99 
REAL WAGES                 0.14    0.22    0.20    0.16    0.14      0.17    0.18 
NET REAL CONS WAGES        0.13   -0.06   -0.54   -1.02   -1.44     -3.21   -4.60 
TERMS OF TRADE            -0.07   -0.07   -0.06   -0.05   -0.03      0.02    0.08 
 
NOM.INT.RATE               0.13    0.19    0.19    0.16    0.14      0.07    0.00 
REAL.INT.RATE             -0.06    0.04    0.06    0.05    0.04      0.00   -0.01 
INFL                       0.23    0.16    0.13    0.12    0.11      0.07    0.02 
TAX LAB.                   0.00    0.17    0.46    0.73    0.98      2.11    2.99 
GOV.DEBT(%GDP)             0.34    1.35    2.34    3.24    4.02      6.92    7.58 
GOV.BALANCE(%GDP)         -0.86   -1.00   -0.99   -0.91   -0.82     -0.41   -0.04 
CURRENT.ACC(%GDP)          0.04    0.04    0.04    0.03    0.03      0.01    0.01 
PRIV.INV(%GDP)            -0.17   -0.21   -0.21   -0.19   -0.16     -0.06    0.00 





                            1      2       3       4       5         10      20 
 
GDP                        0.48    0.38    0.31    0.26    0.21      0.01   -0.14 
EMPLOYMENT                 0.49    0.47    0.40    0.34    0.29      0.05   -0.14 
CONSUMPTION                0.81    0.69    0.58    0.49    0.42      0.06   -0.21 
.CLC                       1.74    1.56    1.30    1.08    0.89      0.04   -0.58 
.CCC                       1.83    1.62    1.34    1.12    0.92      0.02   -0.61 
.CNLC                     -0.15   -0.21   -0.17   -0.11   -0.07      0.09    0.17 
INVESTMENT                -0.31   -0.49   -0.49   -0.44   -0.39     -0.21   -0.08 
INVESTMENT.HOUSE          -0.01   -0.08   -0.10   -0.09   -0.07      0.05    0.11 
.INVESTMENT.H.CC           0.88    1.11    0.94    0.74    0.56     -0.22   -0.67 
.INVESTMENT.H.NLC         -0.22   -0.35   -0.33   -0.28   -0.21      0.12    0.28 
EXPORTS                    0.82    0.52    0.41    0.32    0.25     -0.01   -0.18 
IMPORTS                    0.59    0.23    0.17    0.14    0.12      0.01   -0.10 
REAL WAGES                -0.08   -0.11   -0.12   -0.12   -0.11     -0.03    0.01 
NET REAL CONS WAGES        2.35    2.11    1.78    1.49    1.24      0.17   -0.63 
TERMS OF TRADE            -0.05   -0.06   -0.05   -0.04   -0.03     -0.00    0.02 
 
NOM.INT.RATE               0.08    0.09    0.08    0.07    0.06      0.04   -0.00 
REAL.INT.RATE              0.04    0.08    0.06    0.05    0.03      0.01    0.00 
INFL                       0.08    0.01    0.01    0.02    0.02      0.02   -0.00 
TAX LAB.                  -1.52   -1.39   -1.20   -1.01   -0.85     -0.12    0.40 
GOV.DEBT(%GDP)             0.11    0.82    1.48    2.05    2.56      4.38    4.65 
GOV.BALANCE(%GDP)         -0.66   -0.67   -0.62   -0.56   -0.50     -0.24   -0.00 
CURRENT.ACC(%GDP)          0.02    0.03    0.03    0.02    0.02      0.00   -0.00 
PRIV.INV(%GDP)            -0.13   -0.14   -0.13   -0.11   -0.09     -0.03    0.02 




  41  42
Consumption taxes 
                            1      2       3       4       5         10      20 
 
 
GDP                        0.37    0.22    0.10    0.02   -0.05     -0.36   -0.61 
EMPLOYMENT                 0.37    0.28    0.15    0.05   -0.02     -0.36   -0.63 
CONSUMPTION                0.68    0.53    0.36    0.23    0.11     -0.41   -0.84 
.CLC                       1.44    1.23    0.88    0.56    0.28     -0.91   -1.80 
.CCC                       1.50    1.20    0.81    0.48    0.19     -1.04   -1.94 
.CNLC                     -0.11   -0.16   -0.12   -0.07   -0.02      0.15    0.19 
INVESTMENT                -0.44   -0.79   -0.88   -0.86   -0.82     -0.64   -0.54 
INVESTMENT.HOUSE          -0.07   -0.18   -0.20   -0.18   -0.15      0.01    0.05 
.INVESTMENT.H.CC           0.48    0.44    0.16   -0.12   -0.36     -1.36   -1.95 
.INVESTMENT.H.NLC         -0.20   -0.32   -0.29   -0.20   -0.10      0.32    0.51 
EXPORTS                    0.74    0.44    0.28    0.16    0.06     -0.31   -0.58 
IMPORTS                    0.44    0.10   -0.00   -0.06   -0.10     -0.29   -0.46 
REAL WAGES                 0.00    0.02    0.00   -0.01   -0.01      0.06    0.09 
NET REAL CONS WAGES        1.43    1.19    0.76    0.37    0.02     -1.46   -2.58 
TERMS OF TRADE            -0.06   -0.06   -0.05   -0.04   -0.03      0.02    0.05 
 
NOM.INT.RATE               0.10    0.14    0.13    0.12    0.10      0.06    0.00 
REAL.INT.RATE             -0.01    0.06    0.06    0.05    0.04      0.01   -0.00 
INFL                       0.15    0.08    0.07    0.06    0.06      0.04    0.00 
TAX LAB.                   0.00    0.16    0.41    0.64    0.86      1.82    2.52 
GOV.DEBT(%GDP)             0.26    1.14    2.00    2.76    3.42      5.84    6.26 
GOV.BALANCE(%GDP)         -0.83   -0.87   -0.83   -0.76   -0.68     -0.33   -0.01 
CURRENT.ACC(%GDP)          0.03    0.04    0.03    0.03    0.02      0.01    0.00 
PRIV.INV(%GDP)            -0.13   -0.16   -0.15   -0.13   -0.11     -0.02    0.04 







Note: Top half of each table percentage difference from baseline, bottom half percentage point 
difference from baseline  